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CLOUGH CENTER LECTURE 
A COMMON GAUGE: HARMONIZATION 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
James Bacchus* 
Abstract: The international community should adopt more common 
standards, or common gauges, to help maximize global trade. Nations 
can capitalize on the international division of labor inherent in global 
trade by making many more of the individual parts of the global value 
chain interchangeable. The resulting global common gauge would 
lower costs and increase efficiency, productivity, quality, reliability, and 
diversity of products. To make common commercial standards, however, 
nations must refrain from promulgating trade barriers, such as domestic 
standards, that unnecessarily insulate and advantage national producers 
while discriminating against foreign firms. To combat this “regulatory 
protectionism,” the World Trade Organization should expand upon ex-
isting agreements, such as the TBT and SPS Agreements, that encour-
age WTO Members to adopt regulations that are no more restrictive on 
trade than necessary to achieve stated goals. This action, combined with 
the pressure of economic necessity, will develop a common gauge that 
will harmonize common standards and maximize global trade. 
 
 A favorite book of mine is Speak, Memory, the classic memoir by 
the Russian émigré, Vladimir Nabokov.1 In one chapter, he tells of 
how, in the years shortly before the Bolshevik Revolution, his aristo-
cratic family would flee every year from the snows of tsarist Russia to 
the sunny beaches of southern France. They traveled on the “then 
great and glorious” Nord-Express, the railway that connected St. Pe-
tersburg and Paris. 
 Or, to be more precise about that rail connection, and quoting 
the author, “I would have said: directly with Paris, had passengers not 
been obliged to change from one train to a superficially similar one at 
the Russo-German border . . . , where the ample and lazy sixty-and-a-
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half inch gauge was replaced by the fifty-six-and-a-half inch standard 
of Europe . . . .”2 
 I still recall being struck, when first reading Nabokov’s book 
many years ago, by the spectacle, in August of 1909, of young Vladi-
mir, his extended family, their entourage of servants, and their vast 
assemblage of baggage, all being unloaded with considerable labor 
from one train and being taken in a long procession across the border 
and put on another train just like it—except for the “gauge” of width 
between the wheels and the rails of the two stretches of train tracks. 
 Even then, my interests tended more to the geopolitical than to 
the literary. So, for me, the question prompted by this passage all 
those years ago was not what it taught me about Nabokov’s vivid writ-
ing style; rather, it was: what does the fact that the railways of Russia 
and Europe were not connected by a common gauge teach us about 
all the many historical misconnections between Russia and Europe? 
 Back then, I was immersed in the study of history in preparation 
for what I foresaw as a life spent as a history professor. I had no ink-
ling then that mine would instead be a life spent in the law. And 
much of my study of history at the time was not of Russia, or Europe, 
but of the political and economic emergence of the United States of 
America. 
 Inspired to inquiry by my reading of Nabokov, I learned from 
further reading that the history of the United States may likewise have 
been influenced by the lack of a common gauge on the country’s 
railways. Before the Civil War, the railways of the North used one 
gauge and the railways of the South used another. So there was little 
commerce by rail between North and South. In this way as in other 
ways, the two were less than connected. Not until after the war was a 
common gauge embraced to connect America’s railways—and thus 
help connect and reunite America. 
 The eminent economic historian George V. Hilton has told the 
tale. For two decades following the war, freight from one region to the 
other was—like the Nabokovs’ baggage—still laboriously unloaded 
and loaded from one car to another in the border states where rail-
roads of different gauges met. Then, in one single day, on May 31, 
1886, in a massive effort months in the making, the spikes were pulled 
on thousands of miles of track all across the South, and the rails of the 
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South were moved in by three inches to match the narrower gauge of 
the North.3 
 The newly driven spikes set a common gauge for the whole coun-
try, and helped spark a period of rapid regional economic develop-
ment that historians have labeled the “New South.” This common 
gauge bound the North and the South together economically in ways 
that did not exist in the antebellum era. It is perhaps not too much to 
say that the commercial harmonization of a common railway gauge in 
the later years of the 19th century helped ease the needed transit to-
ward the eventual communal harmony between North and South that 
emerged in the later years of the 20th century and is now largely as-
sumed—despite some continuing sectional differences—in the basic 
unity of America in the 21st century. 
 The trade of commerce thrives on a common gauge. As my fellow 
travelers who serve as the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization 
have said succinctly in their most recent World Trade Report, there is 
“a general finding in the literature that harmonization increases . . . 
trade.”4 A common standard helps maximize trade. The flow of com-
merce grows where there is only one standard to follow, only one 
regulation to meet, only one gauge to use. Where there are many, the 
flow of commerce is less than it could be. Competing standards slow 
the flow of trade. 
 Thus, the history of commerce can be seen in many ways as the 
search for a common gauge. The Northern railway gauge adopted by 
the South in 1886 was identical to the British gauge. The gauge 
adopted by the early British railways was based on the width of medie-
val British wagon roads. The width of those roads can be traced to the 
width of the roads that united the Roman Empire. 
 The same can be said of untold numbers of other goods and ser-
vices that are traded and provided in what has become more and 
more a truly global economy. The commercial need for a common 
gauge has spurred a long-lasting and continuing effort to secure 
common standards. From these common standards have emerged the 
international rules that we call “international law.” The commercial 
need for common standards and for other common ways of doing 
business internationally creates the international rules that are the 
most common kind of international law. 
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 Indeed, it can be said with some assurance that the need for a 
common gauge in international commerce had much to do with the 
emergence of modern international law in the industrial age. As Mark 
Mazower recounts in his new book, Governing the World, one of the 
world’s very first international organizations was the International 
Telegraph Union, which was established in 1865.5 The ITU was estab-
lished, he explains, for a compelling commercial reason— “in order 
to overcome the delays that had been caused by the need to print out 
telegraph messages on one side of the border to walk them across to 
the other side.”6 
 From these origins as an International Telegraph Union devel-
oped, over time, today’s International Telecommunications Union, 
the specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for issues 
relating to information and communication technologies. Represen-
tatives of 193 member countries and 700 other affiliates work together 
writing global rules on these matters in a shiny spire overlooking the 
lake of Geneva just up the street from where I used to work at the 
WTO.7 
 Nor was the International Telegraph Union the only new inter-
national institution that emerged in the late 19th century to meet the 
needs of an industrializing economy in a shrinking world. Mazower 
explains that, among many other internationalizing initiatives, there 
were institutions established to make international rules to speed in-
ternational postal delivery, to unify weights and measures, and to set 
one universal time. Safety-minded British engineers desirous of set-
ting one standard size for screws and bolts, Mazower reminds us, “laid 
the foundation” for today’s International Standards Organization.8 
Broadening from its beginnings in mechanical engineering, the ISO 
now has members in 164 countries and 3,368 technical bodies that 
have published more than 19,500 international standards for prod-
ucts covering virtually every kind of manufacturing and technology.9 
 ISO rules are far from the only common standards that have 
been agreed by standard-setting organizations in recent decades. The 
Codex Alimentarius Commission sets standards for food safety. The 
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International Office of Epizootics sets standards for animal health. 
The International Plant Protection Convention sets standards for 
plant health. Regional and global standards of all kinds abound 
around the world, and they bind the world more tightly together in a 
global economy that is increasingly connected and increasingly one. 
 The logic of a common gauge can be limned by looking again 
into the division of labor in the pin factory described by Adam Smith 
in The Wealth of Nations. “Trade” is, of course, simply another name for 
“the division of labor.”10 All trade is a division of tasks in making 
goods and providing services. What distinguishes our economy in the 
21st century from Smith’s economy in the 18th century is that the 
trade in tasks today has led to ever more elaborate subdivisions of the 
division of labor in ever more complex supply chains that increasingly 
include the entire world. 
 Production now is truly global, and, increasingly, much of inter-
national trade consists of trade in the intermediate goods that serve as 
inputs into the final finished goods that are ultimately sold to con-
sumers. As Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott of the Peterson Institute 
for International Economics have recently summed it up, “A large 
share of 21st century trade requires integrated global supply chains 
that move intermediate and finished goods around the world. Inter-
mediate goods account for 60 percent of global commerce, and about 
30 percent of total trade is conducted between affiliates of the same 
multinational corporation.”11 National borders are relevant to these 
global supply chains only because we choose to believe that national 
borders exist. 
 Nationality still denominates trade, and thus it still defines trade 
law and dictates how we choose up sides in trade disputes. We still 
pretend that products are “from” somewhere. We say they are “from” 
one country or another, and we engage in trade disputes over “our” 
products and “their” products as a result. Yet, with the ascendancy of 
global supply chains, value may be added to products in many places, 
and the most value may not be added where a product is supposedly 
“from.” Political economy today is all about “value added” in global 
supply chains that are best seen as global value chains. With these 
global value chains, products are no longer “from” anywhere. They 
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are “from” everywhere, and they are traded everywhere through the 
workings of the chain. 
 Smith taught us that the “division of labor” that is “trade” is lim-
ited only by the extent of the marketplace. With our successes over 
the past half century in lowering tariffs and other barriers to trade, 
with the willingness by emerging countries in the past two decades to 
open up their economies wider to the wider world, with the revolu-
tionary rise of new communications and information technologies, 
and with all the new advances in travel and transit that can move peo-
ple and goods with unprecedented speed around the planet, the ex-
tent of the marketplace for thousands upon thousands of goods and 
services has become worldwide. Through global trade, this interna-
tional division of labor has given us unprecedented global prosperity. 
 Now, consider this. The division of labor through global value 
chains divides up the tasks of making these goods and providing these 
services. If these tasks can be made identical—if these parts of the 
global value chain can be made interchangeable—then how much 
more prosperous can the world become? What would Eli Whitney or 
Cyrus McCormick or Henry Leland or Henry Ford tell us about the 
potential of interchangeable parts for mass production and wide-
spread prosperity? Or, for that matter, Bi Sheng, who first employed 
the concept of interchangeable parts by using moveable type a thou-
sand years ago in China? 
 The benefits of a common gauge globally can be many. Lower 
costs. Higher efficiency. More productivity. Enhanced quality. Greater 
reliability. More consumer choices made more widely available by an 
international division of labor increased by the interchangeable parts 
that can arise from common global standards. For example: why have 
one set of specifications for an industrial fastener in one country and 
another set of specifications for the same fastener serving the same 
purpose in another? Cannot those two countries agree on what is 
needed in one of Adam Smith’s famous pins to be sufficient to help 
hold a building up? Cannot all countries agree? If they do agree, can’t 
they have identical or mutually recognized certification and testing 
procedures for that pin? Won’t that agreement on a common stan-
dard for making pins ease and thereby increase the international 
trade in pins and thereby add to our overall prosperity? 
 The World Economic Forum, in collaboration with Bain & Com-
pany and the World Bank, has recently released a significant study of 
supply chain barriers to international trade entitled “Enabling Trade: 
2014] Harmonization and International Law 7 
Valuing Growth Opportunities.”12 Their conclusion: “Reducing supply 
chain barriers to trade could increase GDP up to [six] times more 
than removing tariffs,” and, overall, it “could increase GDP by nearly 
5% and trade by 15%.”13 Supply chain trade barriers take many 
forms. Red tape in border administration. Lack of transportation and 
communications infrastructure. And more. One common thread, 
though, to all the worldwide complaints about supply chain barriers 
to trade is always the needless costs arising from the endless duplica-
tions occasioned by the conflicts in competing regulations and the 
absence of common standards. 
 Traditionally, professors of international law and practitioners of 
international diplomacy have tended not to focus much on such 
mundane matters as the making of common commercial standards. 
Henry Kissinger himself supposedly once said—perhaps apocry-
phally—that he had little interest in learning about trade in butter. 
From this I conclude that he would likewise have little interest in 
trade in pins. After all, how could such a trivial matter as mere com-
merce have any consequence at all relevant to the weighty legal and 
diplomatic tasks of war and peace? 
 Lately this has been changing. This has been changing not least 
because of the unfolding work of the World Trade Organization. The 
WTO’s dull dealings with the mundane matter of commerce in butter, 
pins, and the like are increasingly the most prolific source of addi-
tional international law. The WTO Appellate Body and other jurists in 
WTO dispute settlement have produced more international law in the 
past two decades than the International Court of Justice in the Hague 
has produced in the entire past century. The proliferation of WTO 
rules and WTO rulings has added enormously in just a few years to 
the growing body of overall international law. Moreover, increasingly, 
WTO rules and WTO rulings are extending far beyond the traditional 
confines of butter and pins and into almost every corner of global 
concern. 
 Traditional trade issues such as tariffs and customs continue, to 
be sure, to be an important part of international trade law. (I say this 
as someone who spent several months some years ago striving in a 
judgment in a WTO appeal to isolate once and for all the timeless 
definition of an “ordinary customs duty” —and concluded—I think 
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correctly—by not offering any definition at all.) This said, interna-
tional trade law has long since ceased to be mainly about the tariffs 
levied and the customs procedures applied down at the port. Too, 
even at the port, containerization has helped open the way to the 
harmonization of common standards. 
 Indeed, trade law has never been solely about tariffs and customs. 
For example, Article III:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, which sets out the fundamental non-discrimination principle 
of “national treatment” for foreign products when competing with 
like domestic products in the domestic marketplace, has, from the 
very beginning, since 1947, applied to all internal “laws, regulations 
and requirements affecting [the] internal sale, offering for sale, pur-
chase, transportation, distribution or use” of traded products.14 This 
certainly includes standards set out by internal regulations. And, as 
successive rounds of global trade negotiations have reduced tariffs, 
the persistence of distinctive and disparate national standards in in-
ternal regulations for traded goods and services has risen as a divisive 
trade issue. 
 According to the OECD, today about 80 percent of all world 
trade—directly or indirectly—involves standards.15 Out there among 
all those ever-extending and ever-subdividing value chains of global 
commerce, we are increasingly seeing evidence that standards can not 
only serve to bind the world together; they can also be used to help 
keep the world apart. Countries that have made tariff concessions 
with one hand are becoming ever more creative in taking them back 
with the other hand by applying discriminatory regulations. Con-
strained by international law from raising tariffs, they are erecting 
new barriers to trade in the form of domestic standards. Even as in-
ternational standards continue to multiply through the work of the 
ITU, the ISO, and numerous other international standard-setting or-
ganizations, national—and sometimes regional—sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures, technical regulations, and other standards of vast 
variety are increasingly employed as a form of what rightly has been 
called “regulatory protectionism.” 
 Sallie James and Bill Watson of the Cato Institute have recently 
published a perceptive paper on “regulatory protectionism,” which 
they define as “the use of regulatory policy to discriminate against 
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foreign firms in a way that is not necessary to achieve a legitimate ob-
jective.”16 As they point out, drawing the right line as a matter of in-
ternational law between legitimate regulatory measures that serve a 
legitimate public purpose and protectionist measures that serve the 
purpose mainly of insulating and advantaging national producers is 
moving to the forefront in the shaping of a new global trade agenda 
for the 21st century.17 
 As we saw in the second half of the 20th century, with the success 
of the GATT and with the eventual establishment of the WTO, trade 
can help bring and bind the world together. So too can the law of 
trade. What is more, I believe (admittedly a bit idealistically) that the 
success of the international rule of law in trade can, by example, help 
bring and bind the world together by inspiring the increased success 
of the international rule of law outside the realm of trade. As it is, al-
ready, the centrality of standards to so many regulatory concerns that 
affect trade shows us, as do so many other aspects of the emerging 
new agenda of trade, that the reach of trade law extends already to 
many of those other realms. 
 Is your food safe? Will your phone make the call? Can you 
breathe the air? Can you drink the water? Do the lights work? Will the 
“pins” break and the building fall down? Will your “telegraph” in the 
form of a digital text message get from here to there, and will the per-
son there be permitted to read it? These are all already questions re-
lating to trade law, or soon will be. Further, they all can involve “regu-
latory protectionism.” 
 In truth, “regulatory protectionism” is nothing new. It has been 
happening ever since we first began to find success in lowering tariffs 
decades ago. Having put aside history to study law, I first encountered 
the emerging issue of standards as a non-tariff barrier to trade when I 
arrived as a political appointee in the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative in 1979 and expressed the evidently novel de-
sire—for a political appointee—to learn the substance of trade law. I 
was handed a then brand new international trade agreement that I 
was told was the “standards code.” 
 I have long since realized that I was given this assignment as a 
newcomer to trade because standards then were still on the periphery 
of trade concerns. The standards code was concluded by the Con-
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tracting Parties to the GATT during the Tokyo Round of global trade 
negotiations as a way of beginning to confront the emergence of 
standards as obstacles to trade. It bound only those countries that 
signed it, and it was not really enforceable even against them. It was, 
alas, largely ignored. Yet the standards code was nevertheless an es-
sential start toward defining and disciplining “regulatory protection-
ism.” 
 A dozen years later, while a Member of Congress, I helped enact 
the implementing legislation for the Uruguay Round trade agree-
ments that created the WTO. Among the many new trade agreements 
we approved then were two that built on the experience of the stan-
dards code—the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barri-
ers to Trade. The SPS Agreement deals with measures relating to hu-
man, animal, and plant life, health, and safety.18 The TBT Agreement 
deals with other standards and regulatory measures of all kinds that 
affect trade.19 
 Unlike the standards code, the SPS Agreement and the TBT 
Agreement are automatically binding on all WTO Members, and are 
fully enforceable in WTO dispute settlement. As WTO Members 
agreed in establishing the WTO, dispute settlement decisions by the 
WTO are enforceable in that they are backed by the ultimate “last re-
sort” of economic sanctions against countries that choose not to com-
ply with WTO rulings on the obligations in WTO rules. Given this po-
tential price for non-compliance, WTO Members almost always 
choose to comply with WTO rulings. 
 Eight years as a judge in WTO dispute settlement gave me ample 
opportunity to acquaint myself with both the SPS Agreement and the 
TBT Agreement, and I have continued to delve their legal depths in 
the years since I left the WTO. Today, I am far from alone in focusing 
more and more of my attention on these two successors to the stan-
dards code. For standards are no longer at the periphery of the trade 
debate; with the continuing evolution of a fully global economy con-
nected by the endless intricacies of global value chains, and with the 
concurrent rise of “regulatory protectionism,” standards are now at 
the very center of the trade debate. 
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 Research by the World Bank and the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development has shown that technical barriers affect 
about 30 percent of international trade, and that SPS measures affect 
about 15 percent of international trade, including more than 60 per-
cent of trade in agricultural products.20 Furthermore, this research 
has shown that the use of non-tariff measures as barriers to trade is 
rising.21 
 So it should come as no surprise that, within the WTO, an in-
creasing number of international trade disputes involving standards 
and related issues are arising under the SPS Agreement, the TBT 
Agreement, and the GATT. In particular, and importantly, in a series 
of landmark rulings this year, my successors on the WTO Appellate 
Body have clarified the meaning and the interrelationship of some of 
the most basic provisions of the TBT Agreement involving technical 
regulations relating to the domestic sale of tuna, beef, and clove ciga-
rettes. 
 These subjects may seem more than mundane to some, but, as 
might be mentioned to Secretary Kissinger, some of the landmark rul-
ings of the Supreme Court of the United States interpreting the scope 
of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution during the New 
Deal in the 1930s involved the mundane subject of butter.22 In like 
manner, the latest rulings of the Appellate Body on the TBT Agree-
ment will ultimately reach in their implications into virtually every 
aspect of the global economy. 
 Meanwhile, outside WTO dispute settlement, the worldwide de-
bate is intensifying about where and how to draw the right line be-
tween legitimate regulation and “regulatory protectionism.” In bilat-
eral relations between countries such as China and the United States, 
in regional groups such as APEC, in regional negotiations such as 
those on proposed trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic trade agreements, 
and, of course, in the marathon Doha Round of global trade negotia-
tions and other global deliberations by the Members of the WTO, the 
issue of standards is at the center of the debate. 
 At this center, the debate over standards is defined fundamentally 
by the fact that economics and politics are hard to connect. Econom-
ics knows no borders. Politics is defined by borders. The politicians 
find it hard to respond to the borderless economics of global value 
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chains. In the increasing debate over common standards, perhaps 
more than in any other aspect of the current trade debate, the bag-
gage of both economics and politics is piled up, separately, beside the 
railway tracks, awaiting a connection that can best come from global 
agreement on global rules. 
 The two scholars at the Cato Institute have suggested that the 
most important rule we need is one we already have. In their work on 
“regulatory protectionism,” they have argued that the connection that 
should be used to link economics and politics where a proposed stan-
dard is concerned is the extent of the restriction that standard would 
impose on trade. Say Sallie James and Bill Watson, “Requiring agen-
cies to consider and evaluate the impact of a proposed regulation on 
international trade could limit the incidence of protectionism.”23 
 The particular focus of their study is the United States, which, I 
should perhaps point out, was the losing party in all three of the re-
cent landmark disputes over technical regulations in the WTO, on 
tuna, beef, and clove cigarettes. (In full disclosure, I should note, too, 
that I was among the legal counsel advising Mexico as the prevailing 
party in the tuna and beef disputes, and Brazil as an interested third 
party in the clove cigarette dispute.) James and Watson advise that, 
“Prior to implementing a new regulation, federal agencies should be 
required to evaluate the possibility that less trade-restrictive alterna-
tives could meet regulatory goals as effectively as their preferred pro-
posal.”24 They say, “New limits should be placed on the discretion of 
administrative agencies to ensure that regulations meet WTO re-
quirements. In addition to scientific risk assessment and cost-benefit 
analysis, agencies should consider whether proposed rules are more 
trade restrictive than necessary to meet their stated goals. Meeting 
this WTO requirement would prevent almost all regulatory protec-
tionism.”25 
 I agree. In addition, and although the Cato scholars confined 
their comments in their paper to regulations applied by the United 
States, I am confident they would agree with me that every other 
Member of the WTO should do the same. The United States is cer-
tainly not alone in being accused of “regulatory protectionism.” 
Think, for example, of the charges that have been made by their trad-
ing partners about China’s strategic industries initiative or Europe’s 
                                                                                                                      
23 Watson & James, supra note 16, at 19. 
24 Id. at 1. 
25 Id. at 3. 
2014] Harmonization and International Law 13 
data privacy directive or Russia’s whole array of restrictive measures 
resembling Matryoshka nesting dolls. There is no lack of examples of 
measures that have been applied by almost every Member of the 
WTO that might be subject to the charge of “regulatory protection-
ism.” 
 Moreover, and as James and Watson acknowledge, the obligation 
to act in a way that imposes the least possible restriction on trade con-
sistent with a legitimate regulatory purpose is already an obligation to 
which every Member of the WTO has agreed by signing the WTO 
treaty, and by which every Member of the WTO is therefore already 
bound. The SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement are both part of 
the WTO treaty, and I refer you in the treaty to Article 5.6 and Foot-
note 3 of the SPS Agreement and to Article 2.2 of the TBT Agree-
ment, which spell out this obligation in no uncertain terms.26 
 Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement states, “Members shall ensure 
that [SPS] measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to 
achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, 
taking into account technical and economic feasibility.”27 Footnote 3 
to this provision explains that “a measure is not more trade-restrictive 
than required unless there is another measure, reasonably available 
taking into account technical and economic feasibility, that achieves 
the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is 
significantly less restrictive to trade.”28 Similarly, Article 2.2 of the TBT 
Agreement provides that “technical regulations shall not be more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective; taking 
account of the risks non-fulfillment would create.”29 
 Whether any particular measure applied by any WTO Member is 
inconsistent with these treaty obligations is a question to be resolved, 
as we like to say in the WTO, “on a case-by-case basis.” Having judged 
more than a few WTO disputes, I can assure you: every case is indeed 
different. The facts always matter. The point is, these obligations al-
ready exist. Better by far to comply with these obligations than to have 
them quoted against you in an appeal in WTO dispute settlement. 
 All this said, we should not by any means leave the making of 
connections where standards are concerned solely to the judges in 
WTO dispute settlement. The clarification of rules in dispute settle-
ment can only go so far, and, though some obligations already exist, 
                                                                                                                      
26 SPS Agreement, supra note 18, art. 5.6; TBT Agreement, supra note 19, art 2.2. 
27 SPS Agreement, supra note 18, art. 5.6. 
28 Id. art. 5.6 n.3. 
29 TBT Agreement, supra note 19, art 2.2. 
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others must be established. This can only be done through interna-
tional negotiations that improve existing rules and that agree on the 
new rules needed to ensure appropriate domestic space for legitimate 
regulation while fighting back against “regulatory protectionism.” 
Through further rule-making, we must build on the successes so far of 
the SPS and TBT agreements, and of the whole host of global stan-
dard-setting organizations. In the WTO and elsewhere, we must focus 
as a high priority on finding a common gauge through the harmoni-
zation of standards. 
 Harmonization is not required by the WTO treaty, but it is en-
couraged. The words of the WTO treaty have been agreed by all the 
countries that are Members of the WTO, and those words voice their 
shared goals. Both the SPS Agreement (in Article 3.1) and the TBT 
Agreement (in Article 2.6) speak of the aim of harmonizing regula-
tory measures “on as wide a basis as possible.”30 Importantly, too, both 
agreements also establish (in Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement and in 
Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement) a rebuttable presumption legally 
that compliance with a relevant international standard is consistent 
with the WTO treaty for purposes of WTO dispute settlement.31 
 Standardization can also be achieved de facto through mutual 
recognition. Short of full harmonization, both the SPS Agreement (in 
Article 4.1) and the TBT Agreement (in Article 2.7) encourage WTO 
Members to accept the differing standards of other WTO Members as 
“equivalent” to their own if it can be shown that they accomplish the 
same purposes.32 The SPS Agreement, in addition, encourages (in 
Article 4.2) the negotiation of mutual recognition agreements on the 
equivalency of specified SPS measures.33 
 The way forward toward standardization through mutual recog-
nition or harmonization is easier with some issues than others. Where 
one country requires that the vehicle identification number for an 
automobile be stamped on one end of a windshield and another 
country requires that the VIN number be stamped on the other end 
of the windshield, the opportunity for a compromise that will facili-
tate trade is obvious. Where one country has one regulatory view of 
genetically-modified food and another country has an entirely differ-
ent view, the negotiations will be a bit more complicated. Still, nego-
tiations are needed if agreement on international rules can safeguard 
                                                                                                                      
30 SPS Agreement, supra note 18, art. 3.1; TBT Agreement, supra note 19, art 2.6. 
31 SPS Agreement, supra note 18, art. 3.3; TBT Agreement, supra note 19, art 2.5. 
32 SPS Agreement, supra note 18, art. 4.1; TBT Agreement, supra note 19, art 2.7. 
33 SPS Agreement, supra note 18, art. 4.2. 
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legitimate domestic interests while also increasing the flow of interna-
tional trade and investment. 
 In working toward harmonization, Members of the WTO should 
look first to the words on which they have already agreed in the SPS 
and TBT agreements in the WTO treaty, and to how some of those 
words have been clarified in WTO dispute settlement. They should 
look first also to the WTO itself as a forum for their further negotia-
tions on standards. As a practical matter, they may need, initially, to 
take partial approaches, but they should aim to act multilaterally, and 
their shared goal should be to write new rules that will, ultimately, and 
ideally, apply standards globally. 
 It is encouraging that the issue of standards has been addressed 
in a number of recently concluded bilateral trade agreements, and 
that it is now drawing considerable attention on the negotiating table 
in current and contemplated regional negotiations. “WTO-plus” obli-
gations on standards issues have been included in recent free trade 
agreements negotiating by the United States with a number of other 
WTO Members. The United States and the handful of other WTO 
Members engaged in negotiations on a Trans-Pacific Partnership are 
focusing as a cross-cutting issue on reducing regional divergences in 
standards through “regulatory coherence.” Likewise, the United 
States and the member states of the European Union are anticipating 
that many of the benefits anticipated from their proposed Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership would result from mutual 
recognition and from some harmonization of standards. 
 I applaud these efforts. If still in the Congress, I would be sup-
porting these initiatives, and I would surely vote for them. But why 
pursue these initiatives outside the multilateral framework of the 
WTO? Every single country engaged in these regional negotiations is 
a Member of the WTO. If they wish to improve on current WTO obli-
gations on standards, they can do so much more effectively within the 
framework of the WTO treaty. 
 I share in the widespread frustration with the seemingly endless 
impasse in the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations under 
the auspices of the WTO. Under the negotiating approach chosen by 
the Members of the WTO in launching the round more than a dec-
ade ago, nothing can be agreed until everything is agreed by “consen-
sus” of every one of the more than 150 countries engaged in the ne-
gotiations. So far, this has not been possible. We shall perhaps see at 
the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali at yearend if anything can be 
achieved from the Doha round. 
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 But the decision to make the Doha round a “single undertak-
ing”—requiring a consensus on everything before there can be an 
agreement on anything—was a choice made by the Members of the 
WTO. They could have made another choice under the existing rules 
in the WTO treaty. They could still do so in going forward. The WTO 
treaty also permits WTO Members to conclude WTO agreements 
among some but not all WTO Members when a self-selected subset of 
WTO Members is willing to accept new obligations without waiting for 
all other WTO Members to agree to do so. This approach has been 
followed successfully by Members of the WTO on information tech-
nology and on government procurement. It has been followed suc-
cessfully on financial services and on basic telecommunications ser-
vices. Significantly, it is being tried now by the United States, the 
European Union, and other WTO Members as a way of enhancing 
existing WTO commitments on trade in services. 
  To me, this is the way forward for the WTO, and, importantly, 
this is a way that can be pursued without first getting agreement 
among all the more than 150 WTO Members, because it does not re-
quire any change whatsoever in current WTO rules. Those WTO 
Members wishing to make additional concessions and be bound by 
additional obligations can go ahead now and do so. All other WTO 
Members are then free to make those same new concessions and to 
benefit from those same new obligations should they choose to do so 
later. 
 The shared hope in taking this alternative approach to writing 
global rules is that, once a “critical mass” of WTO Members account-
ing for a sufficiently sizeable share of global trade have “acceded” to 
membership in such a “plurilateral” agreement, the economic pres-
sures encouraging other WTO Members to sign that agreement will 
intensify, and that, in time, the “plurilateral” agreement will become 
fully “multilateral.” In fact, this is precisely what happened with the 
standards code I was handed decades ago at USTR, and with the simi-
lar GATT codes on subsidies and anti-dumping duties that were con-
cluded in the Tokyo round. Eventually, they became fully multilateral 
agreements that bind all WTO Members as part of the WTO treaty. 
  The professed hope of all those so busy now negotiating regional 
agreements outside the framework of the WTO is that the regional 
standards they are negotiating will, with time, and with the accumulat-
ing pressure of economic necessity, become fully global. This could 
happen. This is, after all, what happened over time with the Interna-
tional Telegraph Union and with other standard-setting efforts that 
began with only a limited number of countries. The risk, however, of 
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these current efforts outside the WTO is that “regulatory protection-
ism” could become regional as well as national. If not applied care-
fully, regional and other partial efforts to harmonize standards out-
side the WTO may succeed only in raising new barriers to trade with 
those who are not part of those less-than-global understandings. In-
stead of building blocks, these regional efforts outside the WTO could 
become stumbling blocks to global harmonization. 
 The danger is that these regional efforts of integrating could be-
come regional ways of discriminating unfairly. They could become 
exclusive, and not inclusive. Instead of bringing the world closer to-
gether, they could pull some parts of the world farther apart. This is 
in part because, as these regional agreements are currently contem-
plated, additional countries can join the negotiations only with the 
permission of the countries that are already engaged in them. Just the 
other day, for example, the United States announced that it will allow 
Japan to join in the negotiations on a Trans-Pacific Partnership. If the 
TPP negotiations were being conducted within the framework of the 
WTO, Japan would not need U.S. permission or permission from 
other negotiating countries. Japan would have an automatic right to 
participate if it wished to do so. So too would China and every other 
Member of the WTO. 
 The best forum by far for seeking global standards is the global 
forum of the WTO. The WTO is inclusive, not exclusive. WTO rules 
can only be building blocks. All those who are willing to accept and 
abide by WTO rules have the right to share if they choose in the 
bountiful benefits of WTO rules. On standards and on numerous 
other issues of global concern in the 21st century, “plurilateral” 
agreements negotiated within the WTO can become, over time, fully 
“multilateral” as more and more WTO Members come to realize the 
economic importance of embracing the common gauge of new obli-
gations. 
 I fear that, in reciting so many words from the WTO treaty, I risk 
sounding in these thoughts too much like a lawyer. So I return, in 
conclusion, to the young Vladimir Nabokov, shivering with his family 
and their servants in the chill alongside the mismatched tracks at the 
Russo-German border, awaiting a railway connection in 1909. We 
know from his memoir that he never forgot that childhood experi-
ence. 
 As Nabokov wrote long afterwards, “We live not only in a world of 
thoughts, but also in a world of things. Words without experience are 
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meaningless.”34 The things of life can shape our thoughts. The ex-
change of commerce can lead to other human exchanges. The rela-
tionships created by trading things can help establish and support 
other human relationships. The experience of mere commerce can 
have a meaning beyond things—if we find the right words. 
 Where standards are concerned, we must learn from the long 
experience of history, and we must employ this experience to write 
the right words as the right rules of international law. Many of the 
right words are already there in the WTO treaty. More are needed. 
The right words can help us create a meaning relating to things, and 
also a meaning beyond things, for a world awaiting the right connec-
tions. With the right words, we can further and facilitate the making 
for the world of common standards that can help us maximize global 
prosperity. With the right words, we can make a common gauge. 
 
34 Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita 178 (2nd ed. 1989). 
